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4ABSTRACT
Banking sector reforms, which is a major component of
Macroeconomic Adjustment Programme in India, has changed the trends
and patterns of banking over the last six to seven years. This paper seeks
to analyse the trends in credit deployment by industry, by bank group,
by rural and urban areas, and by states over the recent period. The
argument of the paper is that serious regional and sectoral inequalities
are developing in the deployment of commercial credit in this country.
The economic reasoning for nationalising the major banks in 1969
was the imperfection in the allocation of credit. With bank nationalisation
there was a rapid expansion of the banking network into rural and semi-
urban areas, and an increase in the share of agriculture and small industry
and transport and trade in the total credit deployed. The banking sector
reforms have changed this trend. The number of loan accounts has fallen
by 60 lakhs in six years, and the fall is largely confined to agriculture,
transport operators and trade. The new private banks and foreign banks
are increasing their presence in the emerging business of loans for
personal and professional services.
There is a striking regional dimension to the developments of the
last few years. The emerging banks and the existing ones are competing
to expand in South, and North-West India attracted by the growing credit
business in a milieu with strong banking habits. This has resulted in a
drastic reallocation of total commercial credit from the poorer agricultural
states to Delhi, Maharastra and Tamilnadu. The situation is one where
private banks are left to "skim the cream" without investing in the long-
term development of banking habits.
JEL Classification: G21, G28
Key Words: banking sector reforms, nationalisation, directed credit,
regional inequalities.
51.   Introduction
The 1990s saw India implementing Macroeconomic Adjustment
Programme of which the financial sector reform is a major component.
The basic principle guiding financial sector reform was that the financial
system has a crucial role to play in the mobilisation of savings and their
allocation to the most productive uses. The ground for reform was the
several distortions which had crept into the financial system rendering it
unable to meet the challenges of a competitive environment. The most
important factor contributing to this weakness of the system, as argued
by the Narasimham Committee,  was "the impact of policy induced
rigidities such as an excessive degree of central direction of their
operations in terms of investments, credit allocations, branch expansion,
and even internal management aspects of the business ". The reforms,
based on the recommendations of Narasimham Committee, set out to
change the policy environment to ease these rigidities.
The financial sector reform has been initiated at a rapid pace since
1992 and has changed the trends and patterns of banking in this country
over the last six or seven years. This paper seeks to analyze the trends in
credit deployment by industry, by bank group, by rural / urban, and by
6states over 1990-91 to 1996-97. The argument of the paper is that serious
regional and sectoral inequalities are developing in the deployment of
commercial bank credit in this country and a slide back to a situation
similar to that existing prior to bank nationalisation in 1969.
The paper is organised in eight sections. Following this
introduction, Section 2 discusses the economic principles behind the
nationalisation of commercial banks in India and the performance of the
banking sector during the two decades since nationalisation. Section 3
takes up the issue of the beneficial impact of bank lending to agriculture
and small firms. Section 4 discusses the Financial Sector Reform. The
discussion here is confined primarily to banks or depository institutions,
which occupy a dominant position on the financial stage. Section 5
attempts at drawing some patterns from the data on the distribution of
loan accounts and credit by sectors of the economy. This section also
discusses the size of loan per account across the sectors. The discussion
of Section 6 deals with bank groups. The differences among State Bank
of India and its Associates, Nationalised Banks, Foreign Banks and other
Scheduled Commercial Banks are explored in some detail. Section 7
turns to the distribution of banking business in terms of deposits, credit
and branch expansion across the states of India. The emerging inequalities
in the growth of banking business are noted. The paper concludes by
comparing the trends in banking in the 1990s with that prevailing before
nationalisation.
2.    The Nationalisation of Banks in India and Development of
Banking in the 1970s and 1980s
As is well known, the period since 1969, when the major banks in
India were nationalised, the functioning of the banking system has come
to be highly regulated. Entry into banking came to be restricted, branch
expansion was licensed, and the thrust was on opening branch offices in
7non-banked and rural areas. The lending policy also came to focus on
reaching credit to agriculture, small enterprise, artisans and such segments
of population. The first and foremost question in this context is, why
were the major commercial banks nationalized in 1969?
Bank nationalisation was a political act and as such the motives
for it will have to be found in that sphere. But the policy was founded on
economic principles the most influential exponent of which was Raj
(1974)1 . The key arguments of Raj (1974) are presented in this section
largely because they are highly relevant today and provide an essential
background to the discussion of the later sections.
It is well known that credit markets are imperfect. That is the reason,
"monetary authorities always considered it necessary and desirable to
fix both the amount of bank credit to be advanced and the rate of
interest"(Raj 1974: 303). In an imperfect market leaving the decision to
allocate resources to banks will aggravate the imperfections. The market
imperfections, together with certain conventions and practices of banking,
such as not to finance long term investments, not to lend against the
collateral of land etc, "could be seriously in conflict with the larger
economic and fiscal considerations which should govern the distribution
of the investible resources in an economy" (Raj 1974: 306). The need to
nationalise commercial banks followed from this,
" if the dimensions of the problem introduced by
market imperfection in the allocation of resources were
fully recognised, and the objectives of the development
programme kept in mind, one would have expected less
hesitation being shown in nationalising all commercial
1. The lecture on which the paper is based was delivered in 1965, preceding the
nationalisation of banks by four years.
8banks in the country and in using them directly for a more
optimal distribution of finance in the economy. For there
are important reasons why banking enterprises seeking to
maximise their profits would not venture out into areas
and sectors of activity to which high priority needs to be
attached from a larger social and economic point of view"
(Raj 1974: 308).
With nationalisation it was thought that banks could be made to
lend to agriculture, small enterprises, and artisans in rural and semi-
urban areas.
There is an altogether different economic reason for compelling
the banks to carry out a larger social role. It needs to be recognised that
the very basis of profit making in banking activity is the development of
the habit of deposit money. The profits of commercial banks depend on
the proportion of their earning assets to the idle cash reserves they have
to hold- their profits being larger the higher this proportion. This is the
reason commercial banks show a natural bias, "to advance credit to
segments of population which have already developed banking habits,
and to be interested in others only to the extent that they offer deposits
on a more permanent basis (such as through savings deposits) which
would bring cash into the banking system without causing large outflows
of cash from it" (Raj 1974: 309). But in the long run this natural bias
would not help banks, as banking habits cannot be inculcated without
setting up bank offices in non banked areas and advancing credit to
segments of population lacking banking habits.
Exactly for the above reason setting up alternative agencies for
providing credit to the other segments of population and sectors of activity
is also not advisable. In addition,
9"By letting private banks continue and only setting
up special institutions subsidised by the State, the former
are merely permitted to make profits where they can and
the whole responsibility of carrying out the less profitable
(and perhaps socially more productive) tasks borne by the
State at the cost of the general public. There is little
economic or social justification for such an arrangement"
(Raj 1974: 310).
The solution to these problems was sought in nationalising all the
larger banks, with smaller banks allowed to function in a free market.
Raj went on to suggest that priority sector advances be charged market
interest rates to prevent leakage, "except where there is complete
assurance that there will be no such leakage" (Raj 1974: 311).
Having gone into the economic reasoning of bank nationalisation
it will be pertinent to investigate how far the objectives of nationalization
could be realised during the 1970s and 1980s. Till the end of the 1960s
banking was largely an urban/semi urban phenomenon with over 80
percent of the branch offices confined to the urban/semi urban areas
(Table 1). Almost 97 percent of the deposits originated in these areas
with the rural areas contributing about three percent of the total deposits.
Commercial banks were hardly advancing any credit in the rural areas.
Even in the semi-urban and urban areas credit business was
proportionately lower than deposit collection. While over 45 percent of
the total deposits originated in the semi urban and urban areas, only
about 30 percent of the total credit was flowing into these areas. The
metropolitan areas accounting for less than 20 percent of the number of
branch offices, and less than 50 percent of the deposits claimed over
two-thirds the total bank credit. Thus, commercial banking bypassed
vast segments of the Indian population before nationalisation.
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The two decades since nationalisation of the major banks witnessed
a transformation of the Indian banking scenario. The total number of
branch offices, which was around 8000 in 1969 increased to 60000 by
1990. Such expansion was the most rapid in the rural areas of the country.
The share of rural offices in the total increased from 17.6 percent in
1969 to 56 percent by 1989 (Table 1). The share of rural areas in the
total deposits rose from about three percent to 15 percent during the
period. The rise in the share of credit was more spectacular, from 1.5
percent in 1969 to 16.3 percent in 1989. In the case of bank credit, the
gains of the rural areas is entirely explained by the loss of the metropolitan
areas. Overall, the two decades since the nationalisation of commercial
banking in India saw banking being taken from its urban confines to the
vast rural stretches.
The expansion of banking into the rural areas meant a phenomenal
expansion in terms of number of deposit and loan accounts. The total
number of loan accounts showed a rapid increase from about four million
in the early 1970s to over 60 million by 1990 (Table 2). The share of
agriculture in this total increased sharply to over 50 percent by 1982
itself. In terms of number of agricultural loan accounts, the increase was
from about one million in the early 1970s to over 10 million by the early
1980s and to close to 30 million by the early 1990s. Transport operators
and trade also showed significant increases. Hitherto totally neglected
segments, such as artisans and craftsmen, and small-scale industries also
came to occupy an important place.
Along with the growth and diversification in terms of loan accounts
there took place a rapid shift in the composition of the amount of bank
credit. Till bank nationalisation in 1969, industry cornered over 60 percent
of the total bank credit and agriculture could get hardly 10 percent and
small-scale industries about eight percent (Table 3). By the early 1980s,
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the share of agriculture had risen to 17 percent and transport operators
about five percent, and small-scale industries about 12 percent. With the
diversification of portfolio, industry's share came down from over 60
percent in the early 1970s to about 47 percent by the early 1980s and to
about 44 percent by the close of the 1980s.
Between 1969 and 1990, the bank branch offices increased by
51,000 with about 80 percent of them having been opened in rural and
semi-urban areas. The regional distribution also shifted away from
Maharastra, Gujarat, and South India, which accounted for close to 60
percent of the total branch offices in the late 1960s, to the rest of the
country. The share of South India, Maharastra and Gujarat came down
to about 40 percent by the late 1980s and the share of Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan increased from less than 25 percent
to close to 35 percent during this period. The credit deposit ratio also
began showing less variation across the states of India during this period.
The phenomenal banking expansion led to a rapid growth in the
volume of transactions in relation to gross domestic product (GDP). While
in 1969 deposits amounted to 13 percent of GDP and advances to 10
percent, by 1991, deposits had risen to 38 percent of GDP and advances
to 25 percent. The growth of bank deposits led to its higher share in total
financial assets held by the household sector as well.
The expansion of the banking system into the rural areas, while
expanding the deposit and credit as a proportion of GDP, did result in
the cash deposit ratio of the banking system going up. The cash- deposit
ratio which was around eight percent at the time of nationalisation of the
major banks continued to hover around that rate till 1977, despite the
proportion of rural offices and deposits in the total going up. The sharp
increase in the cash- deposit ratio from 8.3 percent to 16.8 percent took
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place between 1977 and 1987 when the proportion of rural credit
increased by almost 10 percentage points.
It is evident that the initial result of taking credit to the rural areas
is a larger cash flow out of the bank. It is only much later with the
development of the deposit habit that the cash outflow tends to decrease.
It is understandable why banks, left to themselves, are hesitant to go to
the rural areas. The profitability is bound to be low with the large cash
outflow.
3. Directed Credit and Investment in Agriculture and by Small
Firms
Following nationalisation of the banks, the policy of directed credit
was instrumental in channelling credit to the priority sector consisting
of agriculture, small-scale industry and weaker sections. It would be
pertinent in this context to inquire whether such flow of commercial
credit had a beneficial impact on investment in agriculture and small
industry.
As regards agriculture, an influential study sought to quantify the
inter-relationship among the investment decisions of government,
financial institutions and farmers and their effects on agricultural
investment and output. The study used data from 85 randomly drawn
districts of India covering the period 1960-61 to 1981-82 and showed
that,
(i)  The banks are more likely to locate branch offices in areas
where the road infrastructure and the marketing system are improving;
(ii)  The expansion of commercial bank branches accelerated the
pace of private agricultural investment; and
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(iii) The effects of primary schools, regulated markets and
commercial banks are particularly large in increasing fertilizer demand.
(Binswanger et al. 1993)
The main finding of the study is that among all the variables,
"Education infrastructure availability and the rural
banks play an overwhelming role in determining
investment, input and output decisions. Availability of
banks is a more important determinant of fertilizer demand
and aggregate crop output than interest rates" (Binswanger
et al. 1993: 337).
Thus, the expansion of rural branch network and directed credit
did have a beneficial effect on agricultural investment and fertilizer
demand.
The effect of directed credit on small-scale industry was similar to
that on agriculture. In this context two questions are asked,
"First can we find differences in the way in which
investment has been determined in small and large firms,
in particular, evidence that small firms have faced more
severe capital market constraints, and can any such
difference be explained? Second, to what extent are the
relatively high investment rates observed in small firms
in the period attributable to the directed credit policy?"
(Eastwood and Kohli 1999: 43).
The analysis, using data for 1965-78, suggests that,
"......directed credit policy in India was, in a narrow
sense, well conceived and successful in the case of small
modern sector firms: the financial constraint that the policy
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was designed to relax does appear to have existed, and the
extra bank credit channelled to small firms does seem to
have raised their investment appreciably" (Eastwood and
Kohli 1999: 57).
Although their analysis referred to the period ending 1978, and
desegregated data are not available since then, aggregate data suggest
the contrasts identified by them still exist (Ajit and Bangar 1997).
It is evident that branch expansion into rural areas had a definite
influence on agriculture and small industry. Bank credit directed into
agriculture and small firms have raised their investment appreciably. To
that extent the objectives of bank nationalization have been fulfilled. No
doubt the expected larger flow of credit into rural areas had a role in
adversely affecting the profitability of the banks by raising the cash-
deposit ratio as well as by lowering the amount per loan account.
4.   The Financial Sector Reform
The period since nationalisation of the banks witnessed the
government increasingly dipping its hands into the resources of the banks.
The deposits mobilised from far flung areas was channelled into
government and public sector by steadily raising the Statutory Liquidity
Ratio (SLR) which reached 38.5 percent of the net demand and time
liabilities of the system by 1991. The resources remaining after such
pre-emption by the government was channelled into the priority sector
consisting of agriculture, small-scale industry and small enterprise. The
figure for priority sector lending reached a target of 40 percent of
aggregate bank credit by 1990. Consequent to the emphasis on small
loans the number of accounts in the priority sector rose from less than
half a million in 1969 to over 35 million by 1990. Naturally the average
size of credit became rather small.
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Along with the regulation of the number and spread of branch
offices and the deployment of credit, an elaborate administered interest
rate structure also came into being. The coupon rates of government
debt were kept very low with long maturity periods in the process
preventing the development of a market for these securities. The interest
rates of deposit accounts of differing maturity were announced as part
of the credit policy. The interest rates of different size class of credit
were also regularly announced. By 1990, there were six different
administered interest rates, for six size class of credit limits, in addition
to a concessional rate for weaker sections of society. Within this structure
of interest rates there were differential rates for agriculture, small-scale
industry and transport operators with up to two vehicles.
The Narasimham Committee having commended the Indian
Banking system for its impressive quantitative achievements during the
two decades since nationalisation in 1969 noted the decline in productivity
and efficiency of the system and the related erosion of profitability. In
the Committee's view the major elements leading to low productivity
and profitability were,
Constraints on operational flexibility owing to directed
investment in terms of SLR together with cash reserve
ratios and directed credit programmes.
Decline in portfolio quality owing to political and
administrative interference in credit decision making.
Concessional interest rate on directed investment and
credit.
Expansion of branch network into rural and semi-urban
areas turning many offices into primarily deposit centres
without adequate credit business and income.
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In addition to the above, the Committee identified numerous factors
such as poor branch reconciliation, lax supervision, and poor quality of
staff as responsible for the low productivity and profitability.
The above diagnosis of the maladies of banking led the Committee
to recommend,
SLR requirements be related to prudential requirements
and be brought down to 25 percent of net demand and
time liabilities.
  The borrowing rates to be brought closer to market rates.
  CRR be turned into an instrument of monetary policy.
Directed credit programme be phased out in the long run;
redefine priority sector in the shortrun, and review the
concessional interest rate. Use fiscal instruments rather
than the credit system to help the weaker sections.
Dismantle the administered interest rate structure and allow
interest rates "to perform their main function of allocating
scarce loanable funds to alternative uses".
Numerous other recommendations were made on capital adequacy
norms, accounting policies and related matters, structural organisation
of the banking system and other matters, the details of which are not
relevant here. Another strong recommendation was that freedom of entry
into the financial system should be liberalised and that there should not
be any difference in treatment between the public and private sector
banks. A related recommendation regarding branch expansion was that
branch licensing be abolished and full freedom be given to banks to
open and close branches.
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The government accepted most of the recommendations of the
Committee on directed investment, administered interest rate structure,
privatization and on branch licensing, and modified the ones on directed
credit. Implementation began soon after. And the last six to seven years
have seen the banking system being turned from a highly regulated to
one with a remarkable degree of freedom.
5.   Sectoral Deployment of Credit Following Reforms
One of the reasons attributed by the Narasimham Committee to
the poor profitability of the banking system is the phenomenal growth
of borrower accounts. It was said that," by 1990, the number of such
(priority sector) accounts had risen to over 35 million and with this the
average size of credit has come down sharply with its obvious and
corollary implications of rising unit costs of administering such loans".
How has the Reform changed such a situation?
A concerted effort seems to have been made in the banking system
to bring down the total number of loan accounts. The total number of
loan accounts has come down from 620 lakhs in 1990-91 to 556 lakhs in
1996-97 (Table 4). The fall in the number of loan accounts has not been
uniform across industry groups. The fall is confined to agriculture,
transport operators and trade- largely those activities coming under the
priority sector. Although industry has also reported a reduction in the
total number of accounts, this is almost entirely on account of the
reduction in "other industries". Industry, other than "other industries",
has in fact, shown a slight increase in the number of loan accounts. The
sharpest increases have however, been reported from the category of
personal loans and professional services, a whooping 36 percent increase.
Thus, in terms of the distribution of loan accounts there is a perceptible
shift away from agriculture, trade, other industries and small-scale
industry to large and medium industry and personal loans and professional
services.
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Distribution of outstanding credit across industry groups follows
the distribution of loan accounts. The share of agriculture, other industries,
trade and transport operators has all come down, and the share of industry
and personal loans and professional services has gone up (Table 5). The
sharpest fall in the credit share has been those of agriculture (3.8
percentage points) and other small-scale industries (three percentage
points). The significant gainers are, industry- other than "other industries"-
and personal loans and professional services, whose shares have gone
up from 40 percent to 44 percent and 10.68 percent to 13 percent
respectively.
The reduction in the number of loan accounts in agriculture, small-
scale industry and trade has not been able to raise the average size of
loan amount in these categories (Table 6). The average size of loan amount
in the above industry groupings has, in fact, come down relative to the
size of loan amount in industry, or overall average loan amount. At the
same time, the size of loans in industry has been going up. The reason
for such a situation becomes evident when one analyses the distribution
of loan accounts by size class of loan amounts. In agriculture, trade and
other industries, over 95 percent of the loans are of size less than Rs.25000
and this has hardly changed during the last seven years. Obviously, there
are constraints in raising the size of loan amount in these industry groups.
In the face of such constraints the strategy to raise the size of average
loan amount overall seems to be to focus on industry, personal loans and
professional services and financial institutions where the size of loan
amounts are higher.
6.   Local Banks and Emerging Business
Narasimham Committee visualized that, "given the freedom of
entry into the financial system, there could be strong possibility that
several new banks with a predominantly local character would be set up
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and existing local banks would find the environment congenial for
increasing the size and scope of their operations". The Committee also
favoured a level playing field for Foreign Banks (FB).
The developments of the last six or seven years have gone as
visualized by the Committee. The FB and other scheduled commercial
banks (OSCB) have been able to increase their shares of deposit and
credit. The State Bank of India and its associates (SBI) have been able to
maintain their share of deposits and credit in the new environment (Table
7). But the Nationalised Banks (NB) as a group have been losing out
their share of deposits and credit. Their share in total credit business has
come down by almost 10 percentage points (from 58 percent to 49
percent) between 1990-91 and 1996-97. The share of NB in total deposits
has come down slowly from 61 percent to 55 percent. The gainers are
FB and OSCB. The Foreign Banks have increased their share in total
deposits and credit by around 1.5 percentage points each. In comparison
the gains of OSCB have been considerably higher at around 5.5
percentage points each. The Regional Rural Banks have not shown much
of a change. Thus, the FB and OSCB seem to be gaining at the expense
of NB.
Industry being one of the sectors gaining in terms of credit share,
it would be of interest to analyse the shares of bank groups in the aggregate
credit to industry (Table 8). Again, SBI has been able to maintain its
share of credit to industry at about 31 percent of the total. The NB has
lost about 10 percentage points in its share of total credit to industry.
The gainers are mainly FB and OSCB, with the gains of the latter being
significant. The share of OSCB has improved from less than three percent
in 1990-91 to close to nine percent by 1996-97.
While in the area of bank credit to industry OSCB has made
significant gains in relation to FB, in the case of PL&PS, the FB has
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gained significantly. The total number of loan accounts (PL&PS) has
increased by about 36 lakhs between 1990-91 and 1996-97 (Table 9). Of
this increase, about 10 lakh accounts have been cornered by FB, 13 lakh
by NB, four lakh each by SBI and OSCB. Interestingly, PL&PS loan
accounts formed almost 90 percent of the total loan accounts of FB
through out this period whereas their share in the total loan accounts of
OSCB has increased from around 20 percent to 40 percent. Thus, it is
evident that the private banks and foreign banks are emerging as highly
specialised in certain areas of banking whereas the NB and SBI continue
to be highly diversified. But one characteristic that distinguishes all bank
groups, including Regional Rural Banks (RRB), is their effort at curtailing
their exposure to agriculture.
As already indicated, total loan accounts (agriculture) have come
down by about 50 lakhs. This reduction in total number of accounts is
distributed among SBI, NB, FB and RRB according to their share in
total number of loan accounts (agriculture) in 1990-91. The FB had
negligible exposure to agriculture and OSCB had about 20 percent of its
loan accounts in agriculture. Both FB and OSCB continue in the same
situation.
Along with the shift in business composition, there has come about
a perceptible change in the composition of credit by duration. The share
of long term loans in the total credit deployed has steadily been coming
down and that of medium term loans going up (Table 11). The share of
demand loans has also been increasing rather significantly. Another
notable trend has been the increase in export related credit (packing credit,
export bills discounted/purchased, etc.). The share of all other types of
credit (mainly inland bills purchased/discounted) has come down
significantly.
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There are two distinct trends observable in the banking sphere
during the last six to seven years. Firstly, a definite shift away from
agriculture, trade and transport operators to industry- that too large and
medium industry- and personal loans and professional services is taking
place. Secondly, an increasing presence of OSCB and FB is visible in
the emerging businesses. These trends have serious implications for the
regional distribution of bank credit. This is the subject we turn to in the
next section.
7.   The Regional Distribution of Banking Business
One of the arguments advanced against branch licensing by the
Narasimham Committee was that "most of the rural branches are
unremunerative and lack viability in their operations". The poor
profitability of rural and semi-urban branches, the committee argued,
was on account of them being primarily deposit centres without adequate
credit business and income. Following the abolition of branch licensing
it would be pertinent to analyse the trends in branch expansion and
deployment of credit across the states of India.
At the all-India level the number of branch offices of commercial
banks increased by 3387 (5.49 percent) during 1990-91 to 1996-97. The
percentage increase showed considerable variation across the states of
India. The highest percentage increase in the number of branch offices
was observed in Punjab, Haryana (over 10 percent), and Delhi (eight
percent) followed by South India and Maharastra (Table 12). Their share
in the total number of branch offices opened was two-thirds. The rest of
the region showed significantly lower percentage increase in the number
of branch offices opened. Thus, the abolition of branch licensing has led
the banks to focus their attention on some selected regions of the country,
especially South and North-West parts.
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The regional concentration of branch expansion is also related to
the privatisation of banking. Significant increases in the number of branch
offices were reported by the foreign banks (22.67 percent) and other
scheduled commercial banks (17.24 percent), while the overall increase
remained at just 5.49 percent. Both SBI and NB groups have shown low
percentage increases, 6.91 percent and 6.14 percent respectively, but
have been able to maintain their shares in the total as RRBs have shown
no growth. The FB have expanded their branch network in the
metropolitan areas, with the exception of Calcutta. The OSCB are
basically concentrated in South India and Maharastra, with 75 percent
of the branches concentrated in this region as of 1990-91. The branch
expansion of OSCB was also mainly confined to this region. Thus, the
OSCB are focusing their business activity in the areas of their origin.
Given the freedom of choice, why is it that the banks focus on
some states and neglect others? A partial answer to that question has
been provided in terms of the location of origin of private banks. A fuller
answer needs, however, to be found in terms of the variation in deposit
and credit business across the states. Taking up deposit business first, it
may be seen that the deposit per branch in rural areas varies widely
across the states of India. The coefficient of variation (percent) of the
per branch deposit (rural) of states varied between 70 to 78 percent during
1990-91 to 1996-97. For an all-India average of Rs. 1.01 crores of deposit
per rural branch office, the amount was Rs. 3.47 crores in Goa, Rs. 2.76
crores in Punjab and Rs. 1.74 crores in Himachal Pradesh. The deposit
amounts in Maharastra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh or Tamilnadu were
not significantly higher than the amounts in Bihar or Uttar Pradesh. In
the urban areas, the deposit per branch office did not show any significant
variation at all. The coefficient of variation was just around 30 percent
in all the seven years. Given that only about 15 percent of the total deposits
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are accounted for by the rural areas, and that the deposit per branch
office in the urban areas did not vary much from state to state, there is no
reason to expect that the attraction of deposits take banks to any particular
state to the neglect of others.
The story is very different when it comes to the credit business per
branch office across the states of India. The coefficient of variation is
fairly high and has been steadily increasing in the 1990s (Table 13). As
regards credit business, there are a few distinct patterns across the states
of India. At one end is Delhi and Chandigarh, where the per branch
credit business amounts to over three times the all-India average. In
Maharastra, it is over twice the national average and has been increasing.
In Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Goa, Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh the
credit business is close to the all-India average and is growing. In Punjab,
Haryana and West Bengal credit business was higher than the all-India
average in the early 1990s, but the growth has been rather slack and they
have lost considerable ground in the 1990s. In the rest of the states, the
credit business per branch office is less than 50 percent of the all-India
average and there has been a decline in the 1990s.
With the discussion of the credit business per branch office across
the states of India, an attempt may be made to answer the question
regarding the attraction of banks to some regions. Banks are basically
attracted by the growing credit business, in a milieu where banking habit
has already developed and the cash outflow is minimised. As the credit
business is increasingly getting concentrated in South, West and North-
West parts of India, the banks are focusing attention in these regions.
The expansion of the branch network and credit business in selected
states and regions has led to some disturbing trends in the shares of
states in total commercial credit. As is evident from Table 14, in the
1980s, Maharastra, Delhi, Gujarat, Kerala, and West Bengal were losing
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their shares in total commercial credit. The rest of the states were
improving their position steadily. Some notable gainers were, Assam
(0.70 percent point), Madhya Pradesh (1.10 percent), Orissa (0.50
percent), and Uttar Pradesh (1.01 percent). The period beyond 1991
witnessed a reversal of this process. Those who improved their shares in
the 1980s were all losing steadily in the 1990s. The losers were, Assam
(0.64 percent), Bihar (0.57 percent), Madhya Pradesh (0.28 percent),
Orissa (0.38 percent), Uttar Pradesh (1.53 percent), and West Bengal
(1.50 percent). The numbers clearly show that all the states which had
improved their shares in the 1980s were pushed back to the situation
prevailing before 1980. This is a great fall. The gainers were just three,
Delhi (1.96 percent), Maharastra (3.56 percent), and Tamilnadu (1.02
percent). Karnataka and Kerala had only made marginal gains.
8.   Summary and Conclusion
The economic reasoning behind nationalisation of large
commercial banks in India is the imperfection in the credit market and
the natural bias of the banks against expanding into the rural areas, and
lending to agriculture and small firms. The two decades since
nationalization in 1969 has seen the expansion of branch network into
the rural and non banked areas and lending to agriculture, small industry
and weaker sections. Studies show that directed lending had a beneficial
impact on investment in agriculture and small firms. The nationalisation
of banks and the directed credit policy is well conceived is borne out by
such findings.
The post-Reform banking trends are slowly reversing the trends
of the two decades since nationalisation. The liberalisation of banking
has aggravated the imperfections in the credit market. The natural bias
of banks has come to the fore and they are increasingly withdrawing
from lending to agriculture, small enterprise and such activities. Branch
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expansion into rural and non banked areas has also stopped. Such
withdrawal would have an adverse impact on the investment and output
in agriculture and small industry was evident from the studies referred
to in Section 3 above.
The new private banks and the already existing ones are competing
to expand in South and North West India attracted by the growing credit
business in a milieu with strong banking habits. This has resulted in a
drastic reallocation of total commercial credit from the poorer agricultural
states to Delhi, Maharastra and Tamilnad. The situation is exactly similar
to the one referred to by Raj (quoted on page 5 above), where private
banks are let to "skim the cream" without investing in the long term
development of banking habits. Should the monetary authorities allow
this to go on?
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Table 1. Distribution (%) of Offices, Deposits & Credit of Scheduled
Commercial Banks by Population Groups 1969-1989
1969 1974 1979 1984 1989
Offices
Rural 17.6 36.1 43.3 53.7 55.7
Semi Urban 40.8 30.5 26.8 20.4 19.3
Urban 23.3 18.3 16.8 15.1 14.7
Metro 18.3 15.1 13.1 10.8 10.3
Deposit
Rural 3.1 7.8 10.6 14.4 15.0
Semi Urban 22.0 22.7 22.5 20.7 21.4
Urban 25.9 24.8 24.9 26.0 25.1
Metro 49.0 44.8 42.0 38.9 38.6
Credit
Rural 1.5 5.3 8.4 14.8 16.3
Semi Urban 11.3 14.7 15.6 16.4 17.3
Urban 20.0 22.9 22.7 23.5 23.0
Metro 67.2 57.1 53.3 45.3 43.5
Source: Reserve Bank of India. Banking Statistics 1972-1995.
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Table 2. Distribution (%) of Loan Accounts by Organisation
 1972-1992
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992
Agriculture 31.61 40.77 50.53 47.87 42.11
Industry 5.13 3.77 4.51 6.95 9.56
Transport Operators 1.21 1.75 2.10 2.48 2.20
Prof. Services &
Personal Loans 27.03 19.64 17.01 14.90 16.78
Trade 6.75 6.46 9.87 14.29 17.94
Others 28.27 27.61 15.98 13.49 11.41
Artisans & Craftsmen 0.68 1.36 3.67 3.61 5.41
OSSI 3.98 3.34 2.29 6.24 3.32
Total 100 100 100 100 100
(accounts in millions) (4.34) (10.75)   (23.52)   (43.44)     (65.86)
Source: Same as Table 1.
Note: Others include Financial Institutions and miscellaneous.
OSSI- other small scale industries.
Table 3. Distribution (%) of Loans Outstanding by Organisation
1972-1992
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992
Agriculture 9.02 10.40 17.15 17.29 14.80
Industry 61.16 47.94 47.35 44.46 47.70
Transport Operators 1.58 2.70 5.15 4.01 2.62
Prof. Services &
Personal Loans 4.96 4.89 6.19 10.74 11.02
Trade 14.85 28.45 18.51 18.75 14.76
Artisans & Craftsmen 0.09 0.21 0.31 0.62 0.69
OSSI 11.87 10.87 11.95 11.96 12.00
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Same as Table 1.,      Note: OSSI- Other Small Scale Industries.
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